Abstract. In the last decade, a number of public key cryptosystems based on combinatorial group theoretic problems in braid groups have been proposed. Our tutorial is aimed at presenting these cryptosystems and some known attacks on them.
1. The braid group 1.1. Basic definitions. The braid groups were introduced by Artin [3] . There are several definitions for these groups (see [71] ), and we need two of them for our purposes.
Algebraic presentation.
Definition 1.1. For n ≥ 2, the braid group B n is defined by the presentation (1.1) σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 σ i σ j = σ j σ i for |i − j| ≥ 2 σ i σ i+1 σ i = σ i+1 σ i σ i+1 for |i − j| = 1 .
This presentation is called the Artin presentation and the generators are called Artin's generators.
An element of B n will be called an n-braid. For each n, the identity mapping on {σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 } induces an embedding of B n into B n+1 , so that we can consider an n-braid as a particular (n + 1)-braid. Using this, one can define the limit group B ∞ .
Note that B 2 is an infinite cyclic group, and hence it is isomorphic to the group Z of integers. For n ≥ 3, the group B n is not commutative and its center is an infinite cyclic subgroup.
When a group is specified using a presentation, each element of the group is an equivalence class of words with respect to the congruence generated by the relations of the presentation. Hence, every n-braid is an equivalence class of n-braid words under the congruence ≡ generated by the relations in (1.1).
Geometric interpretation.
The elements of B n can be interpreted as geometric n strand braids. One can associate with every braid the planar diagram obtained by concatenating the elementary diagrams of Figure 1 corresponding to the successive letters. A braid diagram can be seen as induced by a three-dimensional figure consisting on n disjoint curves connecting the points (1, 0, 0), . . . , (n, 0, 0) to the points (1, 0, 1), . . . , (n, 0, 1) in R 3 . Then, the relations in (1.1) correspond to ambient isotopy, that is: to continuously moving the curves without moving their ends and without allowing them to intersect. It is easy to check that each relation in (1.1) corresponds to such an isotopy (see Figures 2 and 3) ; the converse implication, i.e. the fact that the projections of isotopic 3D figures can always be encoded in words connected by (1.1) was proved by Artin in [3] . Hence, the word problem in the braid group for the presentation (1.1) is also the braid isotopy problem, and thus it is closely related to the much more difficult knot isotopy problem. Birman-Ko-Lee presentation. Like Artin's generators, the generators of Birman-Ko-Lee [11] are braids in which exactly one pair of strands crosses. The difference is that the new set of generators includes arbitrary transpositions of strands (i, j) instead of adjacent transpositions (i, i + 1) in the Artin's generators. For each t, s with 1 ≤ s < t ≤ n, define the following element of B n : a ts = (σ t−1 σ t−2 · · · σ s+1 )σ s (σ 4 for an example (note that the braid a ts is an elementary interchange of the tth and sth strands, with all other strands held fixed, and with the convention that the strands being interchanged pass in front of all intervening strands). Such an element is called a band generator. Note that the usual Artin generators are the generators a t+1,t . This set of generators satisfies the following relations (see [11, Prop. 
2.1] for a proof):
• a ts a rq = a rq a ts if [s, t] ∩ [q, r] = ∅.
• a ts a sr = a tr a ts = a sr a tr for 1 ≤ r < s < t ≤ n.
For a geometric interpretation of the second relation, see Figure 5 . 
Normal forms of elements in the braid group
A normal form of an element in a group is a unique presentation to each element in the group.
Having a normal form for elements in the group is very useful, since it lets us compare two elements, so it gives a solution for the word problem:
Problem 2.1. Given a braid w, does w ≡ ε hold, i.e., does w represent the unit braid ε?
Since B n is a group, the above problem is equivalent to the following problem:
Problem 2.2. Given two braids w, w ′ , does w ≡ w ′ hold, i.e., do w and w ′ represent the same braid?
Indeed, w ≡ w is equivalent to w −1 w ′ ≡ ε, where w −1 is the word obtained from w by reversing the order of the letters and exchanging σ i and σ
everywhere. Also, the normal form gives a canonical representative of each equivalence class.
We present here some known normal forms of elements in the braid group. For more normal forms, see Bressaud [13] , Dehornoy [22] and Dynnikov-Wiest [29] .
2.1. Garside normal form. We start by defining a positive braid which is a braid which can be written as a product of positive powers of Artin generators. We denote the set of positive braids by B + n . This set has a structure of a monoid under the operation of braid concatenation.
An important example of a positive braid, which has a central role in the Garside normal form is the fundamental braid ∆ n ∈ B n :
Geometrically, ∆ n is the braid on n strands, where any two strands cross positively exactly once (see Figure 6 ). The fundamental braid has several important properties:
(1) For any generator σ i , we can write ∆ n = σ i A = Bσ i where A, B are positive braids. (2) For any generator σ i , the following holds:
n is the generator of the center of B n . Now, we introduce permutation braids. One can define a partial order on the elements of B n : for A, B ∈ B n , we write A B where B = AC for some C in B + n . Its simple properties are:
P ∈ B n is a permutation braid (or a simple braid) if it satisfies: ε P ∆ n . Its name comes from the fact that there is a bijection between the set of permutation braids in B n and the symmetric group S n (there is a natural surjective map from B n to S n defined by sending i to the ending place of the strand which starts at position i, and if we restrict ourselves to permutation braids, this map is a bijection). Hence, we have n! permutation braids.
Geometrically, a permutation braid is a braid on n strands, where any two strands cross positively at most once.
Given a permutation braid P , one can define a starting set S(P ) and a finishing set F (P ) as follows:
n } The starting set is the indices of the generators which can start a presentation of P . The finishing set is defined similarly. For example,
A left-weighted decomposition of a positive braid A ∈ B + n into a sequence of permutation braids is:
where P i are permutation braids, and S(P i+1 ) ⊂ F (P i ), i.e. any addition of a generator from P i+1 to P i , will convert P i into a braid which is not a permutation braid.
The following theorem introduces the Garside normal form (or left canonical form or greedy normal form) and states its uniqueness: Theorem 2.3. For every braid w ∈ B n , there is a unique presentation given by: w = ∆ r n P 1 P 2 · · · P k where r ∈ Z is maximal, P i are permutation braids, P k = ε and
For converting a given braid w into its Garside normal form we have to follow the following steps:
(1) For any negative power of a generator, replace σ
n B i where B i is a permutation braid. (2) Move any appearance of ∆ n to the left using the relation: σ n−i ∆ n = ∆ n σ i . So we get: w = ∆ r ′ n A where A is a positive braid. (3) Write A as a left-weighted decomposition of permutation braids.
The idea how to do this is as follows: Take A, and break it into permutation braids (i.e. we take the longest possible sequences of generators which are still permutation braids). Then we get:
where each Q i is a permutation braid. For each i, we compute the finishing set F (Q i ) and the starting set S(Q i+1 ). In case that the starting set is not contained in the finishing set, we take a generator σ ∈ S(Q i+1 )\F (Q i ), and using the relations of the braid group we move it from Q i+1 to Q i . Then, we get the decomposition
We continue this process till we have S(Q i+1 ) ⊆ F (Q i ) for every i, and then we have a left-weighted decomposition as needed. For more details, see [30] . 
Decomposing the positive part into a left-weighted decomposition, we get:
The complexity of transforming a word into a canonical form with respect to the Artin presentation is O(|W | 2 n log n) where |W | is the length of the word in B n [31, Section 9.5].
In a similar way, one can define a right normal form. A right-weighted decomposition of a positive braid A ∈ B + n into a sequence of permutation braids is: A = P k · · · P 2 P 1 where P i are permutation braids, and F (P i+1 ) ⊂ S(P i ), i.e. any addition of a generator from P i+1 to P i , will convert P i into a braid which is not a permutation braid. Now, one has the following theorem about the right normal form and its uniqueness: Theorem 2.5. For every braid w ∈ B n , there is a unique presentation given by:
where r ∈ Z, P i are permutation braids, and P k · · · P 2 P 1 is a rightweighted decomposition.
For converting a given braid w into its right normal form we have to follow three steps, similar to those of the Garside normal form: We first replace σ
n . Then, we move any appearance of ∆ n to the right side. Then, we get: w = A∆ r ′ n where A is a positive braid. The last step is to write A as a right-weighted decomposition of permutation braids. Now we define the infimum and the supremum of a braid w: For w ∈ B n , set inf(w) = max{r : ∆ r w} and sup(w) = min{s : w ∆ s }. One can easily see that if w = ∆ m n P 1 P 2 · · · P k is the Garside normal form of w, then: inf(w) = m, sup(w) = m + k.
The canonical length of w (or complexity of w), denoted by len(w), is given by len(w) = sup(w) − inf(w). Hence, if w is given in its normal form, the canonical length is the number of permutation braids in the form.
2.2. Birman-Ko-Lee canonical form. Based on the presentation of Birman, Ko and Lee [11] , they give a new canonical form for elements in the braid group.
They define a new fundamental word:
See Figure 7 for an example for n = 4. One can easily see the connection between the new fundamental word and Garside's fundamental word ∆ n :
The new fundamental word δ n has important properties, similar to ∆ n :
(1) For any generator a sr , we can write δ n = a sr A = Ba sr where A, B are positive braids (with respect to the Birman-Ko-Lee generators) (2) For any generator a sr , the following holds: a sr δ n = δ n a s+1,r+1 .
Similar to Garside's normal form of braids, each element of B n has the following unique form in terms of the band generators:
positive, j is maximal and k is minimal for all such representations, also the A i 's are positive braids which are determined uniquely by their associated permutations (see [11, Lemma 3.1] . We will refer to Garside's braids P i as permutation braids, and to the Birman-Ko-Lee braids A i as canonical factors.
(the nth Catalan number) different canonical factors for the band-generator presentation [11, Corollary 3.5] , whence there are n! different permutation braids for the Artin presentation. Since C n is much smaller than n!, it is sometimes computationally easier to work with the band-generator presentation than the Artin presentation (see also Section 8.3.2).
As in Garside's normal form, there is an algorithmic way to convert any braid to this canonical form: we first convert any negative power of a generator to δ −1 n A where A is positive. Then, we move all the δ n to the left, and finally we organize the positive word in a left-weighted decomposition of canonical factors.
The complexity of transforming a word into a canonical form with respect to the Birman-Ko-Lee presentation is O(|W | 2 n), where |W | is the length of the word in B n [11] .
As in Garside normal form, one can define infimum, supremum and canonical length for the canonical form of Birman-Ko-Lee presentation.
Algorithms for solving the word problem in braid group
Using ε for the empty word, the word problem is the following algorithmic problem:
Given one braid word w, does w ≡ ε hold, i.e., does w represent the unit braid ε? In this section, we will concentrate on some solutions for the word problem in the braid group. 3.1. Dehornoy's handles reduction. The process of handle reduction was introduced by Dehornoy [19] , and one can see it as an extension of the free reduction process for free groups. Free reduction consists of iteratively deleting all patterns of the form xx −1 or x −1 x: starting with an arbitrary word w of length ℓ, and no matter on how the reductions are performed, one finishes in at most ℓ/2 steps with a unique reduced word, i.e., a word that contains no xx −1 or x −1 x. Free reduction is possible for any group presentation, and in particular for B n , but it does not solve the word problem: there exist words that represent ε ∈ B n , but do not freely reduce to the empty word. For example, the word σ 1 σ 2 σ 1 σ
represents the empty word, but free reductions can not reduce it any more.
The handle reduction process generalizes free reduction and involves not only patterns of the form xx −1 or x −1 x, but also more general patterns of the form σ i · · · σ i σ i is a handle, and hence we see that handle reduction generalizes free reduction.
Reducing a braid yields an equivalent braid: as illustrated in Figure  8 , the (i + 1)th strand in a σ i -handle forms a sort of handle, and the reduction consists of pushing that strand so that it passes above the next crossings instead of below. So, as in the case of free reduction, if there is a reduction sequence from a braid w to ε, i.e., a sequence w = w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w N = ε such that, for each k, w k+1 is obtained from w k by replacing some handle of w k by its reduction, then w is equivalent to ε, i.e., it represents the empty word ε.
The following result of Dehornoy [19] shows the converse implication and the termination of the process of handle reductions: A braid may contain many handles, so building an actual algorithm requires to fix a strategy prescribing in which order the handles will be reduced. Several variants have been considered; as can be expected, the most efficient ones use a Divide-And-Conquer trick.
For our current purpose, the important fact is that, although the proved complexity upper bound of above proposition is very high, handle reduction is extremely efficient in practice, even more than the reduction to a normal form, see [20] .
Remark 3.3. In [24] , Dehornoy gives an alternative proof for the convergence of the handle reduction algorithm of braids which is both more simple and more precise than the one in his original paper on handle reductions [19] .
For more solutions for the word problem for the braid groups, see [28] and [33] .
What is Public Key Cryptography?
The idea of Public Key Cryptography (PKC) was invented by Diffie and Hellman [27] . At the heart of this concept is the idea of using a one-way function for encryption (see the survey paper of Koblitz and Menezes [49] ).
The functions used for encryption belong to a special class of one-way functions that remain one-way only if some information (the decryption key) is kept secret. If we use informal terminology, we can define a public-key encryption function as a map from plain text message units to ciphertext message units that can be feasibly computed by anyone having the public key, but whose inverse function (which deciphers the ciphertext message units) cannot be computed in a reasonable amount of time without some additional information, called the private key.
This means that everyone can send a message to a given person using the same enciphering key, which can simply be looked up in a public directory whose contents can be authenticated by some means. There is no need for the sender to have made any secret arrangement with the recipient; indeed, the recipient need never have had any prior contact with the sender at all. Some of the purposes for which public-key cryptography has been applied are:
• Confidential message transmission: Two people want to exchange messages in the open airwaves, in such a way that an intruder observing the communication cannot understand the messages.
• Key exchange: Two people using the open airwaves want to agree upon a secret key for use in some symmetric-key cryptosystem. The agreement should be in such a way that an intruder observing the communication cannot deduce any useful information about the common secret.
• Authentication: The prover wishes to convince the verifier that he knows the private key without enabling an intruder watching the communication to deduce anything about his private key.
• Signature: The target in this part is: The sender of the message has to send the receiver a (clear or ciphered) message together with a signature proving the origin of the message. Each signature scheme may lead to an authentication scheme: in order to authenticate the sender, the receiver can send a message to the sender, and require that the sender signs this message. Now, we give some examples of the most famous and well-known public-key cryptosystems.
4.1. Diffie-Hellman. In 1976, Diffie and Hellamn [27] introduced a key-exchange protocol which is based on the apparent difficulty of computing logarithms over a finite field GF (q) with a one number q of elements and on some commutative property of the exponent.
Their key-exchange protocol works as follows:
Public keys: q and a primitive element α. Private keys: Alice:
K ij is indeed a shared key since Alice can compute
(mod q). This method is secured due to the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
4.2. RSA. Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [70] introduced one of the most famous and common cryptosystem, which is called RSA. This method is widely used in commerce.
Find two large prime numbers p and q, each about 100 decimal digits long. Let n = pq and φ = φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) (the Euler number). Choose a random integer E between 3 and φ that has no common factors with φ. It is easy to find an integer D that is the "inverse" of E modulo φ, that is, D · E differs from 1 by a multiple of φ.
Alice makes E and n public. All the other quantities here are kept secret.
The encryption is done as follows: Bob, who wants to send a plain text message P to Alice, that is an integer between 0 and n − 1, computes the ciphertext integer C = P E (mod n). (In other words, raise P to the power E, divide the result by n, and let C be the remainder). Then, Bob sends C to Alice.
For decrypting the message, Alice uses the secret decryption number D for finding the plain text P by computing: P = C D (mod n). This method is currently secure, since in order to determine the secret decryption key D (for decrypting the message), the intruder should factor the 200 or so digit number n, which is a very hard task.
Key-exchange protocols based on the braid group
In this section, we present some key-exchange protocols which are based on apparently hard problems in the braid group. After the transmitter and receiver agree on a shared secret key, they can use a symmetric cryptosystem for transmitting messages in the insecure channel.
5.1. Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange protocol. The following scheme was proposed theoretically by Anshel, Anshel and Goldfeld [2] , and implemented in the braid group by Anshel, Anshel, Fisher and Goldfeld [1] .
This scheme assumed that the Conjugator Search Problem is difficult enough (so this scheme, as well as the other schemes described below, would keep its interest, even if it turned out that braid groups are not relevant). The Conjugator Search Problem is: 
We start with two public sets of braids, p 1 , . . . , p k and q 1 , . . . , q m in B n . The secret key of Alice is a word u on alphabet of size k and their inverses, and the secret key of Bob is a word v on a different alphabet of size m and their inverses. We denote by u(p 1 , . . . , p k ) the substitution of the ith letter of the alphabet by p i (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k).
The key-exchange protocol is as follows: 
) where E is the colored Burau representation of the braid group defined by Morton [66] (see Section 8.4 
.1 below).
K is indeed a shared key since Alice can compute
−1 , and they are equal since:
so both of them can compute
The security is based on the difficulty of a variant to the Conjugator Search Problem in B n , namely the Multiple Conjugator Search Problem, in which one tries to find a conjugating braid starting not from one single pair of conjugate braids (p, p ′ ), but from a finite family of such In [1] , it is suggested to work in B 80 with k = m = 20 and short initial braids p i , q j of length 5 or 10 Artin generators.
5.2.
Diffie-Hellman-type key-exchange protocol. Following the commutative idea for achieving a shared secret key of Diffie-Hellman, Ko et al. [48] proposed a key-exchange protocol based on the braid group and some commutative property of some of its elements. Although braid groups are not commutative, we can find large subgroups such that each element of the first subgroup commutes with each element of the second. Indeed, braids involving disjoint sets of strands commute (see also [80] ).
Denote by LB n (resp. UB n ) the subgroup of B n generated by σ 1 , . . . , σ m−1 (resp. σ m+1 , . . . , σ n−1 ) with m = ⌊ n 2 ⌋. Then, every braid in LB n commutes with every braid in UB n .
Here The suggested parameters are n = 80, i.e. to work in B 80 , with braids specified using (normal) sequences of length 12, i.e., sequences of 12 permutations (see [16] ).
6. More cryptology based on the braid group 6.1. Encryption and decryption. The following scheme is proposed by Ko et al. [48] . We continue with the same notation of Ko et al. Assume that h is a collision-free one-way hash function of B n to {0, 1} N , i.e., a computable function such that the probability of having h(b 2 ) = h(b 1 ) for b 2 = b 1 is negligible (collision-free), and retrieving b from h(b) is infeasible (one-way) (for some examples see Dehornoy [20, Section 4.4 
]).
We start with p ∈ B n and s ∈ LB n . Alice's public key is the pair (p, p ′ ), with p ′ = sps −1 where s is Alice's private key. For sending the message m B , which we assume lies in {0, 1} N , Bob chooses a random braid r in UB n and he sends the encrypted text m ′′ B = m B ⊕ h(rp ′ r −1 ) (using ⊕ for the Boolean operation "exclusive-or", i.e. the sum in Z/2Z), together with the additional datum p
, and we have m A = m B , which means that Alice retrieves Bob's original message.
Indeed, because the braids r and s commute, we have (as before):
and, therefore,
The security is based on the difficulty of the Diffie-Hellmann-like Conjugacy Problem in B n . The recommended parameters are as in Ko et al's exchange-key protocol (see Section 5.2). 6.2. Authentication schemes. Three authentication schemes were introduced by Sibert, Dehornoy and Girault [79] , which are based on the Conjugacy Search problem and Root Extraction Problem. Concerning the cryptanalysis of the Root Extraction Problem, see [41] .
Two more authentication schemes were suggested by Lal and Chaturvedi [51] . Their cryptanalysis were discussed in [81] and [41] .
7. Attacks on the conjugacy search problem using Summit Sets
In this section, we explain the algorithms for solving the conjugacy decision and search problems (CDP/CSP) in braid groups that were given in [37, 31, 32, 38] (actually, these algorithms works also in Garside groups, but for our current purposes it suffices).
We follow here the excellent presentation of Birman, Gebhardt and Gonzalez-Meneses [8] . For more details, see their paper.
7.1. The basic idea. Given an element x ∈ B n , the algorithm computes a finite subset I x of the conjugacy class of x which has the following properties:
(1) For every x ∈ B n , the set I x is finite, non-empty and only depends on the conjugacy class of X. It means that two elements x, y ∈ B n are conjugate if and only if I x = I y . (2) For each x ∈ B n , one can compute efficiently a representativẽ x ∈ I x and an element a ∈ B n such that a −1 xa =x. (3) There is a finite algorithm which can construct the whole set I x for any representativex ∈ I x . Now, for solving the CDP/CSP for given x, y ∈ B n we have to perform the following steps.
(a) Find representativesx ∈ I x andỹ ∈ I y . (b) Using the algorithm from property (3), compute further elements of I x (while keeping track of he conjugating elements), until either: (i)ỹ is found as an element of I x , proving x and y to be conjugate and providing a conjugating element, or (ii) the entire set I x has been constructed without encountering y, proving that x and y are not conjugate.
We now survey the different algorithms based on this approach. In Garside's original algorithm [37] , the set I x is the Summit Set of x, denoted SS(x), which is the set of conjugates of x having maximal infimum. [30] , who considered I x = SSS(x), the Super Summit Set of x, consisting of the conjugates of x having minimal canonical length len(x). They also show that SSS(x) is the set of conjugates of x having maximal infimum and minimal supremum, at the same time. In general SSS(x) is much smaller than SS(x).
Starting by a given element x, one can find an elementx ∈ SSS(x) by a sequence of special conjugations, called cyclings and decyclings:
The cycling of x, denoted by c(x) is:
where τ is the involution which maps
r xx r . This means that for an element of positive canonical length, the cycling of x is computed by moving the first permutation braid of x to the end, while the decycling of x is computed by moving the last permutation braid of x to the front. Moreover, for every x ∈ B n , inf(x) ≤ inf(c(x)) and sup(x) ≥ sup(d(x)).
Note that the above decompositions of c(x) and d(x) are not, in general, Garside normal forms. Hence, if one wants to perform iterated cyclings or decyclings, one needs to compute the left normal form of the resulting element at each iteration.
Given x, one can use cyclings and decyclings to find an element in SSS(x) in the following way: Suppose that we have an element x ∈ B n such that inf(x) is not equal to the maximal infimum in the conjugacy class of x. Then we can increase the infimum by repeated cycling (due to [30] and [12] ): there exists a positive integer k 1 such that inf(c k 1 (x)) > inf(x). Therefore, by repeated cycling, we can conjugate x to another elementx of maximal infimum. Oncex is obtained, if the supremum is not minimal in the conjugacy class, we can decrease its supremum by repeated decycling. Again, due to [30] and [12] , there exists an integer k 2 such that sup(d k 2 (x)) < sup(x). Hence, using repeated cycling and decycling a finite number of times, one obtains an element in SSS(x).
If we denote by m the length of x in Artin generators and r is the canonical length of x, then we have (see [30] and [12] ): Proposition 7.3. A sequence of at most rm cyclings and decyclings applied to x produces a representativex ∈ SSS(x). Now, we have to explore all the set SSS(x). We have the following result (see [30] ):
Since SSS(x) is a finite set, the above proposition allows to compute the whole SSS(x). More precisely, if one knows a subset V ⊂ SSS(x) (we start with: V = {x}), one conjugates each element in V by all permutation braids (n! elements). If one encounters a new element z with the same canonical length asx (which is a new element in SSS(x)), then add z to V and start again. If no new element is found, this means that V = SSS(x), and we are done.
One important remark is that this algorithm not only computes the set SSS(x), but it also provides conjugating elements joining the elements in SSS(x). Now the checking if x and y are conjugate, is done as follows: Compute representativesx ∈ SSS(x) andỹ ∈ SSS(y). If inf(x) = inf(ỹ) or sup(x) = sup(ỹ), then x and y are not conjugate. Otherwise, start computing SSS(x) as described above. The elements x and y are conjugate if and only ifỹ ∈ SSS(x). Note that if x and y are conjugate, an element conjugating x to y can be found by keeping track of the conjugations during the computations ofx,ỹ and SSS(x). Hence it solves the Conjugacy Decision Problem and the Conjugacy Search Problem simultaneously.
From the algorithm, we see that the computational cost of computing SSS(x) depends mainly in two ingredients: the size of SSS(x) and the number of permutation braids. In B n , all known upper bounds for the size of SSS(x) are exponential in n, although it is conjectured that for fixed n, a polynomial bound in the canonical length of x exists [31] .
Franco and Meneses [32] reduce the size of the set we have to conjugate with, by the following observation: Proposition 7.5. Let x ∈ B n and V ⊂ SSS(x) be non-empty. If V = SSS(x) then there exist y ∈ V such that σ
Using this proposition, the SSS(x) can be computed as in [30] , but instead of conjugating each element y ∈ SSS(X) by all permutation braids, it suffices to conjugate y by the Artin generators σ i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1).
Note that the algorithm computes a directed graph whose vertices are the elements in SSS(x), and whose arrows are defined as follows: for any two elements y, z ∈ SSS(x), there is an arrow labeled by σ i starting at y and ending at z if σ −1
Hence, the size of the set of permutation braids is no longer a problem for the complexity of the algorithm (since we can use the Artin generators instead), but there is still a big problem to handle: The size of SSS(x) is, in general, very big. The next improvement tries to deal with this.
7.3. The Ultra Summit Sets. Gebhardt [38] defines a small subset of SSS(x) satisfying all the good properties described above, so that a similar algorithm can be used to compute it. The definition of this new subset appeared after observing that the cycling function maps SSS(x) to itself. As SSS(x) is finite, iterated cycling of any representative of SSS(x) must eventually become periodic. Hence it is natural to define the following: Definition 7.6. Given x ∈ B n , we define the Ultra Summit Set of x, USS(x), to be the set of elements y ∈ SSS(x) such that c m (y) = y, for some m > 0.
Hence, the Ultra Summit Set USS(x) consists of a finite set of disjoint orbits, closed under cycling. A more interesting example is given by the element
In this example, USS(x) has 6 elements, while SSS(x) has 22 elements. More precisely, USS(x) consists of 2 closed orbits under cycling: USS(x) = O 1 ∪ O 2 , each one containing 3 elements: 
has an Ultra Summit Set of size 264, instead of the expected size 12 (see [9, Example 5.1]). [8, 9] ).
In the case of braid groups, the size and structure of the Ultra Summit Sets happen to depend very much on the geometrical properties of the braid, more precisely, on its Nielsen-Thurston type: periodic, reducible or Pseudo-Anosov (see
The algorithm given in [38] to solve the CDP/CSP in braid groups (using Ultra Summit Sets) is analogous to the previous ones, but this time one needs to compute USS(x) instead of SSS(x). In order to do this, we first have to obtain an elementx ∈ USS(x). This we do as follows: take an elementx ∈ SSS(x). Now, start cycling it. Due to the facts that cycling an element is SSS(x) will result in another element in SSS(x) and that the Super Summit Set of x is finite, we will have two integers m 1 , m 2 (m 1 < m 2 ), which satisfy:
When having this, the elementx = c
After finding a representativex ∈ USS(x), we have to explore all the set USS(x). This we do using the following results of Gebhardt [38] . Proposition 7.9. Let x ∈ B n and y ∈ USS(x). For every positive braid u there is a unique -minimal element c y (u) satisfying u c y (u) and (c y (u)) −1 y(c y (u)) ∈ USS(x).
Definition 7.10. Given x ∈ B n and y ∈ USS(x), we say that a permutation braid s = 1 is a minimal for y with respect to USS(x) if s −1 ys ∈ USS(x), and no proper prefix of s satisfies this property.
It is easy to see that the number of minimal permutation braids for y is bounded by the number of Artin's generators. Now, we have:
Proposition 7.11. Let x ∈ B n and V ⊆ USS(x) be non-empty. If V = USS(x), then there exist y ∈ V and a generator σ i such that c y (σ i ) is a minimal permutation braid for y, and (c y (σ i ))
In [38] , it is shown how to compute the minimal permutation braids (they are called there minimal simple elements in the Garside group's language) corresponding to a given y ∈ USS(x) (a further discussion on the minimal simple elements with some examples can be found in [9] ). Hence, one can compute the whole USS(x) starting by a single elementx ∈ USS(x), and then we are done.
As the case of the Super Summit Sets, the algorithm of Gebhardt [38] not only computes USS(x), but also a graph Γ x , which determines the conjugating elements. This graph is defined as follows.
Definition 7.12. Given x ∈ B n , the directed graph Γ x is defined by the following data:
(
1) The set of vertices is USS(x).
(2) For every y ∈ USS(x) and every minimal permutation braid s for y with respect to USS(x), there is an arrow labeled by s going from y to s −1 ys.
Concerning the complexity of this algorithm for solving the Conjugacy Search Problem, the number m 2 of times one needs to apply cycling for finding an element in USS(x) is not known in general. Nevertheless, in practice, the algorithm based on the Ultra Summit Sets is substantially better for braid groups (see [8] ). For more information on the Ultra Summit Sets and its structure, see [9] .
Remark 7.13. One might think that for a given element x ∈ B n , it is possible that its Ultra Summit Set with respect to the Garside normal form will be different from its Ultra Summit Set with respect to the right normal form (see Section 2.1). If this happens, it is possible that even though one of the Ultra Summit Sets is large, the other will be small.
Gebhardt and Meneses [39] shows that at least for rigid braids, the size
of the above two Ultra Summit Sets is equal, and their associated graphs are isomorphic. A braid w is called rigid, if the cycling of w, c(w) is already given in Garside normal form, with no need for changing the permutation braids (see also [8, Section 3] and Example 7.7 here). They conjecture that this is the situation for any braid.
More information about this sorts of Summit sets can be found in the series of papers [8, 9, 10] and [53, 54, 55] .
More attacks on the conjugacy search problem
There are some more ways to attack the Conjugacy Search Problem, apart of solving it completely. In this section, we present some techniques to attack the conjugacy search problem without actually solving it. 8.1. A heuristic algorithm using the Super Summit Sets. Hofheinz and Steinwandt [43] use a heuristic algorithm for attacking the Conjugacy Search Problem which is the basis of the cryptosystems of AnshelAnshel-Goldfeld [1] and Ko et al. [48] .
Their algorithm is based on the idea that it is probable that if we start with two elements in the same conjugacy class, their representatives in the Super Summit Set will not be too far away, i.e. one representative is a conjugation of the other by a permutation braid.
So, given a pair (x, x ′ ) of braids, where x ′ = s −1 xs, we do the following steps:
(1) By a variant of cycling (adding a multiplication by ∆ to the first permutation braid, based on Proposition 1 in [52] ) and decycling, we findx ∈ SSS(x) andx ′ ∈ SSS(x ′ ). (2) Try to find a permutation braid P , such thatx ′ = P −1x P .
In case we find such a permutation braid P , since we can follow after the conjugators in the cycling/decycling process, at the end of the algorithm we will have at hand the needed conjugator for breaking the cryptosystem. Note that we do not really need to find exactly s, since eachs which satisfies x ′ =s −1 xs will do the job as well and reveal the shared secret key.
Their experiments show that they succeed to reveal the shared secret key in almost 100% of the cases in the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol (where the cryptosystem is based on the Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Problem) and in about 80% of the cases in the Diffie-Hellman-type protocol.
Note that their attack is special to cryptosystems which are based on the conjugacy problem, since it depends very much on the fact that x and x ′ are conjugate.
8.2.
Reduction of the Conjugacy Search Problem. Maffre [58, 59] presents a deterministic, polynomial algorithm that reduces the conjugacy search problem in braid group.
The algorithm is based on the decomposition of braids into products of canonical factors and gives a partial factorization of the secret: a divisor and a multiple. The tests which were performed on different keys of existing protocols showed that many protocols in their current form are broken and that the efficiency of their attack depends on the random generator used to create the key.
Length-based attacks.
A different probabilistic attack on the braid group cryptosystems is the length-based attack. In this section, we will sketch its basic idea, and different variants of this attack on the braid group cryptosystems.
The basic idea. The basic idea was introduced by Hughes and
Tannenbaum [45] .
Let ℓ be a length function on the braid group B n . In the Conjugacy Search Problem, we have an instance of (p, p ′ ) where p ′ = s −1 ps, and we look for s. The idea of a probabilistic length-based attack to this problem is: if we can write s = s ′ σ i for a given i, then the length ℓ(σ i s −1 psσ −1 i ) should be strictly smaller than the length ℓ(σ j s −1 psσ
Thus, for using such an attack, one should choose a good length function on B n and run it iteratively till we get the correct conjugator.
Choosing a length function.
In [35] , we suggest some length functions for this purposes. The first option is the Garside length, which is the length of the Garside normal form by means of Artin generators (i.e. if w = ∆ r n P 1 P 2 · · · P k , then ℓ Gar (w) = r|∆|+|P 1 |+|P 2 |+· · ·+|P k |). A better length function is the Reduced Garside length (which is called Mixed Garside length in [31] ). The motivation for this length function is that a part of the negative powers of ∆ n can be canceled with the positive permutation braids. Hence, it is defined as follows: if w = ∆ −r n P 1 P 2 · · · P k , then:
This length function is much more well-behaved, and hence it gives better performances. But even this length function did not give a break of the cryptosystems (by the basic length-based attack).
In [42] , Hock and Tsaban checked the corresponding length functions for the Birman-Ko-Lee presentation, and they found out that the reduced length with respect to the Birman-Ko-Lee presentation is even better than the reduced Garside length.
The memory approach.
The main contribution of [34] is new improvements to the length-based attack.
First, it introduces a new approach which uses memory: In the basic length-based attack, we hold each time only the best conjugator so far. The problem with this is that sometimes a prefix of the correct conjugator is not the best conjugator at some iteration and hence it is thrown out. In such a situation, we just miss the correct conjugator in the way, and hence the length-based algorithm fails. Moreover, even if we use a 'look ahead' approach, which means that instead of adding one generator in each iteration we add several generators in each iteration, we still get total failure for the suggested parameters, and some success for small parameters [35] .
In the memory approach, we hold each time a given number (which is the size of the memory) of possible conjugators which are the best among all the other conjugators of this length. In the next step, we conjugate all the conjugators in the memory by one more generator, and we choose again only the best ones among all the possibilities. In this approach, in a successful search, we will often have the correct conjugator in the first place of the memory.
The results of [34] show that the length-based attack with memory is applicable to the cryptosystems of Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld and Ko et al, and hence their cryptosystems are not secure. Moreover, the experiments show that if we increase the size of the memory, the success rate of the length-based attack with memory becomes higher.
Applicability of the length-based approach.
One interesting point about the length-based approach is that it is applicable not only for the Conjugacy Search Problem, but also for solving equations in groups. Hence, it is a threat also to the Decomposition Problem and for the Shifted Conjugacy Problem which was introduced by Dehornoy (see [21] and Section 10.1.1 here).
Moreover, the length-based approach is applicable in any group which has a reasonable length function, e.g. the Thompson group, as indeed was done by Ruinskiy, Shamir and Tsaban (see [72] and Section 9.2.1 here).
Attacks based on linear representations.
A different way to attack these cryptographical schemes is by using linear representations of the braid groups. The basic idea is to map the braid groups into groups of matrices, in which the Conjugacy Search Problem is easy. In this way, we might solve the Conjugacy Search Problem of B n .
The Burau representations.
The best known linear representation of the braid group B n is the Burau representation [14] . We present it here (we partially follow [52] ).
The Burau representation is defined as follows. Let Z[t ±1 ] be the ring of Laurent polynomials f (t) = a k t k + a k+1 t k+1 + · · ·+ a m t m with integer coefficients (and possibly with negative degree terms). Let GL n (Z[t ±1 ]) be the group of n × n invertible matrices over Z[t ±1 ]. The Burau representation is a homomorphism B n → GL n (Z[t ±1 ]) which sends a generator σ i ∈ B n to the matrix:
where 1 − t occurs in row and column i of the matrix. This representation is reducible, since it can be decomposed into the trivial representation of dimension 1 and an irreducible representation B n → GL n−1 (Z[t ±1 ]) of dimension n − 1, called the reduced Burau representation, which sends a generator σ i ∈ B n to the matrix:
where t occurs in row i of the matrix. If i = 1 or i = n − 1, the matrix is truncated accordingly (see [52] ). Note that these matrices satisfy the braid group's relations:
The Burau representation of B n is faithful for n = 3 and it is known to be unfaithful for n ≥ 5 [64, 65, 56, 5] (i.e. the map from B n to the matrices is not injective). The case of n = 4 remains unknown. In the case of n ≥ 5, the kernel is very small [82] , and the probability that different braids admit the same Burau image is negligible.
Here is a variant of the Burau representation introduced by Morton [66] . The colored Burau matrix is a refinement of the Burau matrix by assigning σ i to C i (t i+1 ), so that the entries of the resulting matrix have several variables. This naive construction does not give a group homomorphism. Thus the induced permutations are considered simultaneously. We label the strands of an n-braid by t 1 , . . . , t n , putting the label t j on the strand which starts from the jth point on the right. Now we define:
Definition 8.1. Let a ∈ B n be given by a word σ
, e j = ±1. Let t jr be the label of the under-crossing strand at the rth crossing. Then the colored Burau matrix M a (t 1 , . . . , t n ) of a is defined by
er .
The permutation group S n acts on Z[t
] from left by changing variables: for α ∈ S n , α(f (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = f (t α(1) , . . . , t α(n) ). Then S n also acts on the matrix group GL n−1 (Z[t 
Then it is easy to see the following:
(1) CB n is a group, with identity element (e, I n−1 ) and (α, M)
2) C(σ i )'s satisfy the braid relations and so C : B n → CB n is a group homomorphism. (3) for a ∈ B n , C(a) = (π a , M a ), where π a is the induced permutation and M a is the colored Burau matrix.
Using the Burau representation, the idea of Hughes [44] to attack the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld scheme [2, 1] is as follows: take one or several pairs of conjugate braids (p, p ′ ) associated with the same conjugating braids. Now, it is easy to compute their classical Burau image and to solve the Conjugator Search Problem in the linear group.
In general, this is not enough for solving the Conjugator Search Problem in B n , because there is no reason for the conjugating matrix that has been found to belong to the image of the Burau representation, or that one can find a possible preimage. Since the kernel of the classical Burau representation is small [82] , there is a non-negligible probability that we will find the correct conjugator and hence we break the cryptosystem.
In a different direction, Lee and Lee [52] indicate a weakness in the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol in a different point. Their shared key is the colored Burau representation of a commutator element.
The motivation for this attack is that despite the change of variables in the colored Burau matrix by permutations, the matrix in the final output, which is the shared key, is more manageable than braids. They show that the security of the key-exchange protocol is based on the problems of listing all solutions to some Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Problems in a permutation group and in a matrix group over a finite field. So if both of the two listing problems are feasible, then we can guess correctly the shared key, without solving the Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Problem in braid groups.
Note that Lee-Lee attack is special to this protocol, since it uses the colored Burau representation of a commutator element, instead of using the element itself. In case we change the representation in the protocol, this attack is useless.
The Lawrence-Krammer representation.
The Lawrence-Krammer representation is another linear representation of B n , which is faithful [6, 50] . It associates with every braid in B n a matrix of size n 2 with entries in a 2-variable Laurent polynomial ring Z[t ±1 , q ±1 ]. Cheon and Jun [17] develop an attack against the scheme of DiffieHellman-type protocol based on the Lawrence-Krammer representation: as in the case of the Burau representation, it is easy to compute the images of the involved braids in the linear group and to solve the Conjugacy Problem there, but in general, there is no way to lift the solution back to the braid groups.
But, since we only have to find a solution to the derived DiffieHellman-like Conjugacy Problem: Problem 8.3. Given p, sps −1 , and rpr −1 , with r ∈ LB n and s ∈ UB n , find (rs)p(rs) −1 .
Taking advantage of the particular form of the Lawrence-Krammer matrices, which contain many 0's, Cheon and Jun obtain a solution with a polynomial complexity and they show that, for the parameters suggested by Ko et al. [48] , the procedure is doable, and so the cryptosystem is not secure.
Public-Key cryptography in the Thompson group
When some of the cryptosystems on the braid groups were attacked, it was natural to look for different groups, with a hope that a similar cryptosystem on a different group will be more secure and more successful. The Thompson group is a natural candidate for such a group: there is a normal form which can computed efficiently, but the decomposition problem seems difficult. On this base, Shpilrain and Ushakov [75] suggest a cryptosystem.
In this section, we will define the Thompson group, the ShpilrainUshakov cryptosystem, and we discuss its cryptanalysis.
Definitions and the Shpilrain-Ushakov cryptosystem.
Thompson's group F is the infinite noncommutative group defined by the following generators and relations: [15] : i+1 occurs as well. The transformation of an element of F into its normal form is very efficient [75] .
We define here a natural length function on the Thompson group: K is a shared key since Alice can compute K = a 1 u 2 b 1 and Bob can compute K = b 2 u 1 a 2 , and both are equal to K since a 1 , a 2 commute with b 1 , b 2 .
Here is a suggestion for implementing the cryptosystem [75] : Fix a natural number s ≥ 2. Let S A = {x 0 x −1 1 , . . . , x 0 x −1 s }, S B = {x s+1 , . . . , x 2s } and S W = {x 0 , . . . , x s+2 }. Denote by A, B and W the subgroups of F generated by S A , S B , and S W , respectively. A and B commute elementwise, as required.
The keys a 1 , a 2 ∈ A, b 1 , b 2 ∈ B and w ∈ W are all chosen of normal form length L, where L is a fixed integer, as follows: Let X be A, B or W . Start with the empty word, and multiply it on the right by a (uniformly) randomly selected generator, inversed with probability 1 2 , from the set S X . Continue this procedure until the normal form of the word has length L.
For practical implementation of the protocol, it is suggested in [75] to use s ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 8} and L ∈ {256, 258, . . . , 320}.
9.2. Attacks on the cryptosystem. In this section, we present some attacks on the Ushakov-Shpilrain cryptosystem.
9.2.1. Length-based attack. As mentioned before, the length-based attack is applicable for any group with a reasonable length function. Ruinskiy, Shamir and Tsaban [72] applied this attack to the Thompson group.
As before, the basic length-based attack without memory always fails for the suggested parameters. If we add the memory approach, there is some improvement: for a memory of size 1024, there is 11% success. But if the memory is small (up to 64), even the memory approach always fails. They suggest that the reason for this phenomenon (in contrast to a significant success for the length-based attack with memory on the braid group) is that the braid group is much closer to the free group than the Thompson group, which is relatively close to an abelian group.
Their improvement is trying to avoid repetitions. The problem is that many elements return over and over again, and hence the algorithm goes into loops which make its way to the solution much difficult. The solution of this is holding a list of the already-checked conjugators, and when we generate a new conjugator, we check in the list if it has already appeared (this part is implemented by a hash table). In case of appearance, we just ignore it. This improvement increases significantly the success rate of the algorithm: instead of 11% for a memory of size 1024, we now have 49.8%, and instead of 0% for a memory of size 64, we now have 24%.
In the same paper [72] , they suggest some more improvements for the length-based algorithm. One of their reasons for continuing with the improvements is the following interesting fact which was pointed out by Shpilrain [74] : there is a very simple fix for key-agreement protocols that are broken in probability less than p: Agree on k independent keys in parallel, and XOR them all to obtain the shared key. The probability of breaking the shared key is at most p k , which is much smaller.
In a different paper, Ruinskiy, Shamir and Tsaban [78] attack the key agreement protocols based on noncommutative groups from a different direction: by using functions that estimate the distance of a group element to a given subgroup. It is known that in general the Membership Problem is hard, but one can use some heuristic approaches for determining the distance of an element to a given subgroup, e.g., to count the number of generators which are not in the subgroup.
They test it against the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol, which is based on Thompson's group F , and show that it can break about half the keys within a few seconds.
9.2.2.
Special attack by Matucci. Some interesting special attack for the Ushakov-Shpilrain cryptosystem can be found in Kassabov and Matucci [62] and Mattuci [61] .
Future directions
In this section, we will present some future directions for the cryptography based on the braid group. 10.1. Recent cryptosystems based on the braid group. In this part, we present recent updates on some problems in the braid group, on which one can construct a cryptosystem.
A cryptosystem based on the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem.
Recently, Dehornoy [21] suggested an authentication scheme which is based on the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem.
Before we describe the scheme, let us define the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem. Let x, y ∈ B ∞ . We define:
where dx is the shift of x in B ∞ , i.e. d is the injective function on B ∞ which sends the generator σ i to the generator σ i+1 for each i ≥ 1. In this context, the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem is: Problem 10.1. Let s, p ∈ B ∞ and p ′ = s * p. Find a braids satisfying p ′ =s * p. Now, the suggested scheme is based on the Fiat-Shamir authentication scheme: We assume that S is a set and (F s ) s∈S is a family of functions of S to itself that satisfies the following condition:
Alice is the prover who wants to convince Bob that she knows the secret key s. Then the scheme works as follows: Alice: Chooses a random r ∈ S and sends Bob x = F r (p) and x ′ = F r (p ′ ). Bob: Chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice. Alice: If c = 0, sends y = r (then Bob checks: x = F y (p) and
Dehornoy [21] suggests to implement this scheme on LD-systems. A LD-system is a set S with a binary operation which satisfies:
The Fiat-Shamir-type scheme on LD-systems works as follows:
Public key: Two elements p, p ′ ∈ S such that p ′ = s * p. Private keys: Alice: s ∈ S.
Alice: Chooses a random r ∈ S and sends Bob x = r * p and x ′ = r * p ′ . Bob: Chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice. Alice: If c = 0, sends y = r (then Bob checks: x = y * p and
Now, one can use the shifted conjugacy operation as the * operation on B ∞ in order to get a LD-system. So, in this way, one can achieve an authentication scheme on the braid group with a non-trivial operation [21] . This suggests introducing new schemes in which the secret key is a short braid word, and the public key is another longer equivalent braid word. It must be noted that the NP-hardness result holds in B ∞ only, but it is not known in B n for fixed n.
The advantage of using an NP-complete problem lies in the possibility of proving that some instances are difficult; however, from the point of view of cryptography, the problem is not to prove that some specific instances are difficult (worst-case complexity), but rather to construct relatively large families of provably difficult instances in which the keys may be randomly chosen.
Based on some experiments, Dehornoy [20] suggests that braids of the form w(σ does not occur, could be relevant. The possible problem of this approach is that the shortest word problem in B n for a fixed n is not so hard. In B 3 , there is polynomial-time algorithms for the shortest word problem (see [4] and [83] for the presentation by the Artin generators and [84] for the presentation by band generators). Also, this problem was solved in polynomial time in B 4 for the presentation by the band generators [46] . For small fixed n, Wiest [83] conjectures for an efficient algorithm for finding shortest representatives in B n . Also, an unpublished work [36] indicates that a heuristic algorithm based on a random walk on the Cayley graph of the braid group might give good results in solving the shortest word problem.
In any case, a further research is needed here in several directions:
(1) Cryptosystem direction: Can one suggest a cryptosystem based on the shortest word problem in B ∞ , for using its hardness due to Paterson-Razborov? (2) Cryptanalysis direction: What is the final status of the shortest word problem in B n for a fixed n?
10.1.3. Cycling problem as a potential hard problem. In their fundamental paper, Ko et al. [48] suggested some problems which can be considered as hard problems, on which one can construct a cryptosystem. One of the problems is the Cycling Problem:
Problem 10.7. Given a braid y and a positive integer t such that y is in the image of the operator c t . Find a braid x such that c t (x) = y.
Maffre, in his thesis [57] , shows that the Cycling Problem for t = 1 has a very efficient solution. That is, if y is the cycling of some braid, then one can find x such that c(x) = y very fast.
Following this result, Gebhardt and Gonzales-Meneses [39] has shown that the general Cycling Problem has a polynomial solution. The reason for that is the following result: The cycling operation is surjective on the braid group [39] . Hence, one can easily find the tth preimage of y under this operation.
Alternative distributions.
For overcoming some of the attacks, one can try to change the distribution of the generators. For example, one can require that if the generator σ i appears, then in the next place we give more probability for the appearance of σ i±1 . In general, such a situation is called a Markov walk, i.e. the distribution of the choice of the next generator depends on the choice of the current chosen generator.
A work in this direction is the paper of Maffre [59] . After suggesting a deterministic polynomial algorithm that reduces the Conjugacy Search Problem in braid group (by a partial factorization of the secret), he proposes a new random generator of key which is secure against his attack and the one of Hofheinz and Steinwandt [43] .
Cryptosystems based on different non-commutative groups.
The protocols presented here for the braid groups can be applied to other non-commutative groups, so the natural question here is: Problem 10.8. Can one suggest a different non-commutative group where the existing protocols on the braid group can be applied, and the cryptosystem will be secure?
Some suggestions were given in this direction. As we already saw in the previous section, some cryptosystems and cryptanalysis is based on the Thompson group.
We survey here some more suggestions. 
